In certain government circles, the narrative has been gaining ground that the patent system primarily serves foreign interests, especially those of large multinationals, and that any delays in the granting of patents by the INPI would not result in significant economic losses. In some versions of this discourse, it is suggested that patent protection could negatively impact the trade balance or restrict local players.

With all due respect, this view strikes me as mistaken.

The debate should not be framed as a choice between ‘protecting multinationals’ or ‘protecting the national interest’. This is a false dichotomy.

The real issue is another: what kind of environment does Brazil wish to offer to those who invest in innovation, research, development and industrialisation?

No economy that is currently a leader in technology has built its competitiveness by undermining institutional predictability.

On the contrary. Legal certainty, regulatory stability and respect for intangible assets are part of the economic infrastructure of any country that wishes to compete seriously for sophisticated investments.

Companies that invest heavily in technology do not choose jurisdictions solely based on the size of the consumer market. They choose predictability. They choose institutional consistency. They choose environments where the rules are clear and minimally stable. They need stable conditions for decades on end so that a meaningful business plan can be put into practice.

And this matters even more when we look at the Brazilian reality.

For decades, Brazil has been undergoing a clear process of losing industrial relevance. The manufacturing sector’s share of Brazilian GDP has fallen consistently over time and now stands at just over 10 per cent, a figure incompatible with the ambition of a country that aims to play a leading role in technology and industry.

Of course, this scenario does not stem exclusively from the intellectual property system, but from a broader set of factors. Even so, it seems reasonable to consider that the institutional predictability associated with innovation is also part of this context.

Modern industry does not depend solely on physical assets. It depends on technology, knowledge, technology transfer and the protection of intangible assets.

When the institutional environment conveys uncertainty, capital naturally seeks alternatives.

One of the most striking aspects of this debate is the attempt to downplay the economic impacts of delays in patent examination.

Time, in this context, has economic value.

Administrative delays do not merely affect the patent granted at the end of the process. They affect investment decisions, licensing strategies, industrial planning and the general perception of risk.

Often the damage occurs even before the patent is granted, at the moment a company decides where to set up an operation, where to develop a particular technology or to which jurisdiction to direct capital.

And here lies a contradiction that merits reflection.

Whilst the official discourse speaks of modernising the INPI, structural investments and a commitment to greater administrative efficiency, there is resistance to mechanisms such as the PTA – Patent Term Adjustment – whose logic is quite simple: if there is an unjustified delay caused by the public administration itself, the private party should not bear the full brunt of this loss.

If the promise is one of efficiency and the definitive overcoming of historical bottlenecks, why the resistance?

If the system were to function properly, a mechanism of this nature would tend to have a very limited impact.

The inconsistency becomes even more evident when this stance is analysed in parallel with the support for Bill 2,210, which tends to restrict the procedural flexibility of applicants, particularly regarding amendments and technical adjustments during examination.

In other words: the technical scope for private action is restricted, whilst at the same time compensation is rejected when the delay stems from the public sector itself.

This does not strike me as the best message for those viewing Brazil as a potential investment destination.

And this matters because Brazil is competing for capital.

Our investment in research and development remains low by international standards. Whilst Brazil stands at just over 1% of GDP, countries such as South Korea invest more than 5%, and China already operates at a level far higher than Brazil’s.

We are not competing in isolation. We are competing with economies that actively seek to attract technological investment, sophisticated industrialisation and research centres.

In this scenario, institutional signals matter greatly.

Ultimately, the discussion is not about protecting foreign interests. It is about deciding whether Brazil wants to be merely a large consumer market for technology developed by others, or whether it intends to create the real conditions to participate competitively in the global innovation economy.

Because countries that seek a leading role in technology strengthen, rather than undermine, legal certainty.